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of the world from the safety of a mountain of gold. Britain, in contrast,
has been stubbornly clinging to an exchange parity that dooms the
country to chronic payments deficits and repeated crises of confidence.
Mr. Shonfield emphasizes the liberalization and expansion of inter-
national trade as a factor favorable to postwar Western prosperity, and
he rightly points to the international monetary system as a potential
Achilles' heel. He does not, however, sufficiently consider how the struc-
ture of exchange rates caused liberalization of trade and other inter-
national transactions to have quite a different impact on the various
countries he studied.
Mr. Shonfield, to his credit, devotes the concluding chapter of his
book to a thoughtful essay on the problem of assuring democratic
control of the economic planning he admires. This is more than the
usual problem of controlling a bureaucracy to which power of decision
on important complex matters has been delegated. How can elected
officials control intimate collaboration between bureaucratic experts
and organized private interests? How do spokesmen and negotiators
for functional groups-Labor or Business or Chemical Industry or
Agriculture-acquire legitimacy? The corporate state is not an appe-
tizing prospect. Fortunately a democratic government can probably
plan and guide the growth of a mixed economy without enlarging its
powers or sharing them with private groups.
JAMES TOB1t
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION. By Louis L. Jaffe."
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965. Pp. xvi, 792.
After many years of judicial review of government agencies, the law
on this subject is still obscure and uncertain. Professor Louis L. Jaffe's
important new treatise, Judicial Control of Administrative Action,
describes the judicially developed techniques to control or, perhaps
more accurately, to influence administrative action. He discusses such
basic matters as standing, sovereign immunity, exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, and the scope and manner of judicial enforcement of
agency orders. But beyond the usual topics, Professor Jaffe also deals
with less frequently considered problems, such as the judicial power to
t Sterling Professor of Economics, Yale University; A.B. 1939, M.A. 1940, Ph.D. 1947,
Harvard University.
* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1208 [Vol. 75:1205
REVIEWS
issue stays pending administrative decisions and damage actions against
governmental officers.
To the practicing lawyer involved with administrative agencies, the
book undoubtedly will be a valuable reference. Professor Jaffe is no
mere chronicler of precedent. He has analyzed the cases and, more
important, has given them the benefit of mature consideration. He does
not hesitate to criticize positions taken by courts or other commentators
or to restate concepts and rules in ways which, he believes, more accu-
rately reflect the present state or direction of the law. The work is of
particular value in that Professor Jaffe's views are likely to have sig-
nificant impact on future developments in this area.' My principal
disagreement with Jaffe concerns his treatment of judicial review of
agency procedural decisions. In a relatively brief discussion, Jaffe is
understandably critical of courts which have reversed agency actions
on procedural grounds when their real motive for reversal was a dis-
agreement on the merits. He believes these decisions hinder agency
attempts to improve their procedures. In the absence of clear legal
prescriptions to the contrary, Jaffe thinks "reasonable" procedural
decisions should not be disturbed.
In my view, courts should continue to play an important role as
monitors of agency procedure. Without judicial prodding, agencies
have displayed far less ability or willingness than courts to fashion fair
and prompt procedures. Thus the courts have not supervised the agen-
cies' prehearing procedures, and, correspondingly, the agencies have
failed to develop simple and expeditious prehearing techniques.
Contrary to Jaffe's views, I doubt that vesting greater discretion in
agencies with respect to procedure would make their proceedings less
cumbersome or protracted. In fact, many of the deficiencies in agency
adjudicatory proceedings seem to be due to the unwillingness of
agencies and their hearing examiners to let the parties clarify and define
issues. In my experience, there is a marked contrast between the atti-
tudes of agencies and of judges on this point. Trial judges are much
more insistent that the parties eliminate minor issues. Agency proceed-
ings, on the other hand, are frequently filled with disputes on trivial
matters. Furthermore, judicial scrutiny has been an important pro-
tection against arbitrary agency action. I believe that in the absence of
meticulous review by the courts, agencies would pay mere lip-service
1. See, for example, the reliance of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
on Jaffe's writings with respect to standing in Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, No. 19409, D.C. Cir., March 25, 1966.
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to the fairness of their procedures, because of their primary interest in
achieving regulatory objectives.
Professor Jaffe's book extensively discusses the metes and bounds of
judicial review of the adjudicatory proceedings, with particular em-
phasis on those of the federal administrative agencies. The heart of
Professor Jaffe's approach is the requirement that the judiciary consis-
tently recognize the respective roles of the agency and the court in
fact-finding and lawmaking. Specifically, he believes it essential that
questions of "fact," on which agency determinations are given greater
weight, be distinguished from questions of "law." Professor Jaffe takes
strong issue with the courts which gloss over the fundamental distinc-
tion between "fact" and "law" in order to disguise administrative
agency lawmaking as factual adjudication. He disputes the pragmatic
position of Professor Kenneth C. Davis that a determination of what is
"fact" or "law" should depend on whether or not the reviewing court
believes the question is more appropriately decided by a court or by an
agency. Jaffe vigorously asserts that consistent application of legal prin-
ciples requires that the courts recognize agency lawmaking for what it
is.
While Jaffe's arguments have some validity, there is real doubt
whether the available legal tools are sharp enough to make consistent,
principled classifications of "fact" and "law." For example, Jaffe defines
findings of fact as "the assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is
or will be happening independent or anterior to any assertion as to its
legal effect." But this definition, which Jaffe himself submits is subject
to qualification, may provide little effective guidance. 2
Jaffe would have courts determine the role of agency expertise in
lawmaking by evaluating that expertise in the light of the terms and
over-all purposes of the relevant legislation. But it does not seem to me
that this approach will significantly reduce the courts' burdens.
Other aspects of judicial review of agency findings reflect similar
difficulties. For example, Jaffe discusses the "whole record require-
ment" of the "substantial evidence test" announced by the Supreme
Court in Universal Camera.3 Under this test, as Professor Jaffe recog-
nizes, the reviewing court must take into account matters in the record
which would lessen the weight of the evidence supporting the agency's
findings. Nevertheless, he argues that the judges must be careful not to
weigh the evidence as a whole. Once a judge has determined that there
2. As Judge Henry Friendly indicated in NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d
583, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1961).
S. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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is a "reasoned probability" of the fact found by the agency, he must
accept it even though on the whole record the judge believes that a
contrary inference is much more probable. In principle the concept
may have some validity; but, as Jaffe himself recognizes, it is quite a
subtle and difficult one. And if in practice judges cannot follow it,
perhaps we should leave a determination of substantial evidence to the
dictates of their own consciences.
In short, a number of Jaffe's distinctions are elusive and difficult to
apply. This is probably inevitable, however, in view of the inherent
complexity of judicial review of agency action. Even Jaffe wisely cau-
tions against regarding principles of administrative law as dogma and
urges that, in cases involving matters of great importance (particularly
to individuals), judicial review must be more exacting than what is
normally prescribed by the rules.
4
As Jaffe's analyses demonstrate, judicial review has limitations, and
we cannot depend on it alone to ensure that agencies operate within
the limits of powers granted them and in conformance with accepted
legal principles. The agencies themselves must have a strong commit-
ment to legal principles. This is particularly necessary because in many
areas agency action cannot realistically be subject to judicial review or
even a formal agency hearing. To cite a few instances: the Securities
and Exchange Commission staff engages in virtually unreviewable
regulation in proxy contests. The parties in such contests are required
to submit all proxy soliciting materials to the SEC for "comments" by
the staff. The parties are under severe pressure to conform their mate-
rials to the staff's comments, regardless of their validity. If the staffs
comments are not followed, there is a risk that the agency will seek
injunctive relief. The mere commencement of a suit might well cause
the dissenting party to lose the contest, even though ultimately the
agency's position may be reversed by the court. Similarly, the Food and
Drug Administration can, by advising producers of its views, regulate
the type of new food products that may be introduced to the public. To
ignore the agency advice is to risk seizure of the product after it has
been distributed to retail outlets. The publicity or disruption of mar-
keting attending such a seizure might well be the kiss of death for the
new product, and the threat dissuades a potential producer from his
plan.
4. Jaffe has further expounded on this position in his recent comments, Burden o
Proof and Scope of Review, 79 HARV. L. REv. 914 (1965). in which be comments on the
reversal by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals of an order of deportation in Sherman
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 350 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 196).
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At one point in the treatise, Professor Jaffe states that administrative
agencies are but another room in the "great mansion of law." But fre-
quently an agency and its personnel forget that they are part of a legal
system. This lack of sensitivity may be due to the wide discretion often
vested in the agencies under vague grants of authority, which make
them feel outside the sphere of law. Also, in the case of agencies directly
involved in enforcement, agency members are often committed to
certain preconceived objectives and place less emphasis on making
determinations in accordance with accepted legal techniques. Perhaps
it is too much to expect agencies engaged in enforcement activities to
behave otherwise-we would not, for example, anticipate that a district
attorney's office would make an altogether objective court.
Nevertheless, it is the lack of real commitment to principles of law
that has, in my view, contributed to the failure of administrative agen-
cies to develop workable and clear standards.5 The absence of such a
commitment can result in reliance on "expertise" to rationalize deci-
sions based largely on the members' prejudices and preconceptions.
One way of mitigating this problem would be to reformulate our
basic attitudes toward agencies. Specifically, our conception of agencies
and courts as essentially different institutions may have outlived its
usefulness. In a number of important ways, the differences between
them are negligible. For example, both the Federal Trade Commission
and the National Labor Relations Board, in adjudicating unfair prac-
tices and in fashioning remedies under the statutes which they admin-
ister, operate very much in the manner of courts, utilizing the same
evidentiary principles and giving somewhat similar deference to stare
decisis. There is no reason why we should not expect these and other
agencies to take both formal and informal action on the basis of rea-
soned and supported determinations.
Professor Jaffe's treatise makes a valuable contribution to the subject
of judicial control. Hopefully, it will lead to refinement of judicial
techniques which will improve the quality of judicial review of agency
action. This refinement should imbue in the agencies themselves a
greater dedication to legal principles. Improved judicial control must
be accompanied by internal strengthening of these agencies if we are
really to perfect our administrative process.
STUART J. LAND"
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